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I would like to congratulate Professor Wilner, members of the
student body, and Amnesty International for organizing this confer-
ence. You may not know it, but it is the first regional meeting of
the American Society of International Law, or indeed any meeting
of the American Society of International Law, that has addressed
the issue of ratification of these treaties since 1976.1 This fact may
suggest one reason why these treaties have not moved much more
rapidly in the ratification process. I would like to express my ap-
preciation to Professor Sohn as well. It goes without saying that he
is Mr. International Human Rights Law. Several years ago he very
graciously, after some publication of mine, wrote me a letter saying
he was passing me the human rights torch. After his presentation
today, I think it is apparent that he just handed me a flashlight
because he obviously still carries the torch himself. Lastly, I would
like to issue a bit of an apology, because while I did send the
organizers a little extract from a speech I gave at the American
Society four years ago that you have been given, 2 basically that is
all that I have to say today. The speech is still relevant because
nothing has happened in the last four years in so far as what we
are concerned with here today. We have had no progress on the
Covenants whatsoever, as I shall point out in detail. With that as
background, let me get to my remarks.
My first point concerns the causes for nonratification. I think we
are not talking law so much as we are talking politics and political
will. As an academic, it is somewhat embarrassing to have to give
a stump speech, but that is really what I am going to give today. A
lot of the discussion on the Covenants is focused on narrow legal
issues. There are obviously some important legal issues concerned.
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The hearings that were held in 1979, 3 a small book to which I shall
refer later on,4 and a handful of articles have addressed these issues.
Basically, however, there has not been a serious and sustained look
at the legal issues with respect to the Covenants since they were
submitted by President Carter back in 1978.1 One of the reasons for
this lack of a serious study may be the fact that the Covenants present
few real legal difficulties.
In the grand tradition of the American Society of International
Law, its founder Elihu Root and other members like Chief Justice
Hughes, Secretary of State Stimson and Secretary of State Hull all
were government lawyers as well as practitioners. It seems to me
unfortunate that in our legal community today we have splits between
academics, government officials and practitioners. I think we lose a
great deal because those persons who spend time and care analyzing
the Covenants, being mainly academics, emphasize some of the rather
narrow technical and legal issues to the exclusion of larger, political
concerns. They then reflect and wonder why nobody catches fire with
respect to ratification of the treaties they are critiquing. I suggest
that one reason is because the issue really is one of politics, not of
law.
Professor Henkin in all his writings, and in a very good recent
book called The Age of Rights, 6 speaks of a deep isolationism in the
United States as the basis for the refusal to ratify or even seriously
consider human rights treaties. There is no doubt that in the United
States it has always been thought, and this view goes back to the
Truman Administration, that human rights treaties are needed by
other people, not by us. We have this great Constitution that sup-
posedly makes the protection of human rights by international law
superfluous. However, the Constitution does not say many of the
things that the human rights treaties say. It does not give one the
right to an education, the right not to be tortured, nor a variety of
other rights to which Professor Henkin devotes most of a chapter.7
Some of these rights evolved from what he calls United States con-
stitutionalism, but they are not found in the Constitution itself.
International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (hereinafter Hearings).
4 See infra note 15.
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTING FOUR TREATIES PERTAINING TO Hu-
MAN RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. Nos. C, D, E & F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
6 L. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
1 Id., ch. 9.
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A look overseas may be instructive. When England ratified the
European Convention on Human Rights, it never thought the Con-
vention would have much impact upon it. Anthony Lester, the great
English barrister and the head of Interights in London, has written
an excellent article on this point.8 Now that the 30 year rule has
allowed access to government papers, we discover that the Labour
government was not very keen to ratify the European Convention
on Human Rights in the first place. Moreover, it was insistent upon
the exclusion of the right to property from the European Convention.
This right is present in the First Protocol, of course, but is not in
the Convention itself. The minutes of the Cabinet reveal that a major
argument for ratification was that there would be no need to change
English law, and indeed upon ratification no legislation was intro-
duced to alter then-existing law. In short, England would not be
affected by the Convention: its benefits were for other people.
This argument also has been made in the United States. In fact,
it is made by most of the supporters of human rights treaties. It is
thought to be a good argument, and, to some extent, it perhaps
defuses a bit of the opposition. However, it seems to me to ignore
other facts. One is that we increasingly see Supreme Court cases
today where United States constitutional law lags behind the law of
the European states under the European Convention. 9 So, we have
some things to learn from other countries as well. If one admits this
fact, one also must acknowledge that human rights treaties, if ratified,
might obligate the United States to make at least some changes in
federal and state laws. Is there the political will in the United States
today to expose the country to this "risk"?
It is instructive, I think, to look at the state of the civil rights
movement in the United States today. After great strides in the 1960s
and 1970s, it ran out of steam in the 1980s. The United States has
not passed a civil rights act, a real civil rights act, since the 1980
statute dealing with prisoners' rights.10 Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan
Administration's Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Di-
vision, refused to enforce that statute. Similar legislation has met the
I Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated?, PUBLIC LAW 46
(Spring 1984).
9 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Constitution does not
protect consenting adult male homosexuals) with Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 149 (1981) (Article 8 of European
Convention protects such persons).
,0 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1982).
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same fate. The Supreme Court has been "retrenching" if not actually
retreating on one case after another in the civil rights area. The recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez" does
not say the Constitution is inapplicable overseas, but it does hold it
not to apply to aliens overseas. Thus both the Congress and the
Court seem reluctant to establish or find new human rights. Why
then, should we expect the Executive and the Senate to move ahead
with the human rights treaties? If there is a lack of progress by one
branch, why should progress occur in another? I think too much
emphasis, and perhaps it is misplaced emphasis by many of the people
in the human rights area, is placed on the argument that there must
be something wrong with our presentation if, after all these years,
we cannot get even the two Covenants ratified. Well, there is a lot
wrong with our presentation, to which I shall come directly, but even
if an effective presentation were made, it would be made in a context
where it would fall on almost deaf ears.
Now, there has been a failure on the part of the proponents of
the human rights treaties to make a strong case. As I already have
indicated, there has been a complete lack of discussion, debate, and
books and articles about the four treaties sent to the Senate by
President Carter in 1978. Additionally, very little literature on the
treaties that have been sent up since then has appeared. Some literature
has appeared on the Torture Convention, fortunately moving ahead
towards ratification, but almost nothing on the other very basic
treaties. In fact, no one really appears to know how many treaties
are signed by the United States, signed and sent up to the Senate
by the President, or just out there awaiting action. Among the latter
I would include United Nations treaties to which the United States
could become a party, like the Convention Against Discrimination
in Education. 2 I am sure the Department of State does not know
itself how many human rights treaties exist. I was a consultant to
the Department of State from 1978 to 1979 on human rights treaties.
I helped prepare for the hearings on the Covenants when a conscious
effort was made to discover the status of human rights treaties and
the United States' position with respect to these treaties. 3 As far as
" 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (a non-resident alien held not to benefit from Fourth
Amendment protection from search-and-seizure by United States authorities of prop-
erty owned by the alien and located in a foreign country).
12 Adopted Dec. 14, 1960, entered into force May 22, 1962, 429 U.N.T.S. 32.
,1 For the privately-published end product of this study, see R. LILLICH, INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (Supp. 1990).
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I know, there has not been any further effort within the Department
to update this work. Here, as elsewhere, the proponents of the human
rights treaties have not placed pressure either on the Executive or on
the other political branch, the Congress, in this regard.
Hearings were held in 1979.'4 They remain the only hearings con-
ducted on the treaties. In addition to these hearings, the only other
material concerning the treaties is found in a 1981 book I edited
called U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties. 15 As I suggested
before, little has been written on this subject during the past decade.
The book I edited is not the last word, of course, but it is basically
the only word.
Let me read to you the opening remarks at these hearings. They
indicate the lack of interest in the treaties before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at the time. The following statement is from
Senator Pell who is now, of course, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee. "The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.
As the witnesses know, the hearing is scheduled for 9:30 .... Is
the Honorable Arthur Goldberg here?" He was involved in the Hel-
sinki process at the time, working for the government. "[No re-
sponse] .... Is the Honorable Warren Christopher here?" As the
Deputy Secretary of State, he was the person who drafted and signed
all the letters sending the treaties up to the Senate. "[No response]."
Here is where it really hurts. "Are Ms. Patricia Derian and the
Honorable Roberts Owen," Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, "here. [No re-
sponsel. ' '"6 I hypothesize that they must have been caught in traffic
or they did not expect the hearing called for 9:30 A.M. to start at
9:33 A.M. So, while I do not want to jump on these people too
much, I do think it is symbolic that they were not in the starting
blocks and ready to go when these important hearings began.
Of course, we must consider the lack of Congressional interest as
well as Executive support. I shall come back to that point in just a
moment. There is also what I call the reciprocal passing of blame.
You talk to the Foreign Relations Committee today and they say the
ball is in the President's court. They are not going to waste time
unless they have a committed President. On the other hand, Secretary
, See supra note 3.
'5 U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RE-
SERVATIONS? (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
'" Hearings, supra note 3, at 1.
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of State Baker wrote last winter to Chairman Pell to the effect that,
"We are not going to do anything until you indicate interest in going
ahead." So part of our job, I think, assuming we are all concerned
about ratification, or at least the serious consideration of these trea-
ties, is to knock some heads together. That involves a political as
well as a legal effort. The effort should be made, as the United States
suffers in many ways from their nonratification.
There are several effects of the United States' nonratification of
the human rights treaties. As any one who has talked abroad or
functioned in a diplomatic context knows, other states view our refusal
to ratify the treaties as another example of United States arrogance,
a manifestation of a hypocritical foreign policy that embraces human
rights in the form of protests against abuses elsewhere, yet refuses
to undertake the same commitments that we ask other states to take.
We see this scenario repeated over and over again in debates between
diplomats and academics, at the United Nations in New York or
Geneva, before other bodies, and before groups in Africa, Asia and
Latin America. It is impossible to go overseas and talk about United
States human rights and foreign policy without being challenged about
the United States' nonratification of these treaties.
A second effect of nonratification is the loss of the opportunity
for enforcement against other nations and the clarification of the
norms present in the human rights treaties involved. We have invoked
the Civil and Political Covenant against Iran, Poland, and many
other countries, yet we are unable to participate in the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations. We cannot clarify the law there,
nor may we take advantage of the opportunity to bring a complaint
against another state violating the Covenant. We cannot sit in judg-
ment upon communications submitted by individuals to the Com-
mittee. We will not have the opportunity to do so until we come
aboard the Civil and Political Covenant. The same is true with the
enforcement devices in other treaties as well.
Third, the refusal to ratify these treaties deprives citizens in the
United States of the opportunity to invoke these treaties within the
United States. We heard earlier about self-executing instruments. As
most of you know, a declaration to the effect that the human rights
treaty in question is non-self-executing now has become a standard
technique. I do not know how we are going to get around such
declarations. We must eventually acknowledge the problem, and either
fight or succumb to it. We should start, perhaps, by asking the
Executive Branch to reconsider these proposed declarations. Roberts
Owen, then Legal Advisor, testified at the 1979 hearings that if in
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the Senate's view any reservation or declaration was thought to be
unnecessary, then the Department would draw them back. 17 Frankly,
I think it would be pretty difficult to draw many of them back today,
but we have seen other reservations to the Torture Convention drawn
back or modified. More of them should be too. It is ridiculous to
have thirty-eight declarations, understandings, statements, and reser-
vations made to four treaties, as was done in 1978.
In any event, as long as the United States fails to ratify these
treaties, no one can raise the argument in a domestic court that a
treaty provision might be self-executing. Therefore, if a state wanted
to execute a pregnant teenager, which is possible under current United
States law and preserved by a reservation to the Civil and Political
Covenant that President Carter recommended to the Senate in 1978,
that state would continue to have the "right" to do so. If the Senate
should ratify the treaty without the reservation and without the non-
self-executing declaration, then the pregnant teenager could not be
executed.
Lastly, it seems to me that the United States is entirely out of step
both with current events and our own self-interest in the future.
Events in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. are happening that surprise
all of us from day to day. While attending a conference in Paris in
March 1989, a speaker from the Soviet Union announced for the
first time that the U.S.S.R. intended to ratify the Optional Protocol
to the Civil and Political Covenant. It is "mindboggling" to hear
the Soviet Union announce that it will let individual communications
from Soviet citizens go to the Human Rights Committee. The Hun-
garians already have done so, with the Poles and Czechs supposedly
scheduled to do the same. These developments certainly undercut the
arguments raised in 1988 by the Department of State against rati-
fication of the Civil and Political Covenant.' 8
Having surveyed the causes and effects of nonratification, I will
turn briefly to some attempts to achieve ratification. The United
States has ratified a handful of human rights treaties. The Eisenhower
Administration, in response to Senator Bricker, decided not to go
ahead with ratification of any human rights treaty, but the Kennedy
Administration consciously sought the three most innocuous treaties
that it could find to establish the pattern Mr. Baab talked about.
17 Hearings, supra note 3, at 42.
18 Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings Before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1988).
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They found the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slav-
ery.' 9 We fought the War Between the States over a hundred years
ago, but they felt it necessary to pick out that little treaty. The
Convention on the Political Rights of Women20 also was selected.
The 19th Amendment gave women the right to vote, all that that
convention seeks to accomplish. And those two treaties were ratified,
despite, I should add, the opposition of the ABA at the time. The
third treaty was the ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Com-
pulsory Labour. 2' Once again, we fought a Civil War over the issue
of slavery and forced labor. However, amazingly this treaty still has
not been ratified. Later, President Johnson sent up the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 22 which somehow slipped through
the Senate because nobody paid any attention to it. Perhaps it was
not thought to be a human rights treaty.
President Nixon did nothing except reaffirm support for the rat-
ification of the Genocide Convention. The break came when President
Carter, as part of his comprehensive human rights policy, sent up
the four human rights treaties in 1978. In 1980, he sent up the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women. 23 So the Senate has before it the two Covenants, the Amer-
ican Convention, the Racial Convention, the Convention on Women,
and the more recent Torture Convention.Y
Many things are wrong with the reservations, declarations, and
understandings attached to these instruments. Let us start with the
three principles that were adopted by the Carter Administration. They
probably were wrong on all three, most certainly wrong on the first,
which was that ratification of the treaties should be accomplished in
such a way that no impact or potential impact on United States law
would ever occur. Hence, every time a treaty might require a change
in legislation, a reservation, declaration or understanding was added.
,9 Signed Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force, Apr. 30, 1957).
20 Opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193
U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7, 1954).
21 Adopted June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932).
22 Signed Jan. 21, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
23 Adopted Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.46) at
193, U.N. Doc. A/34/136 (1980) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
24 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
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Professor Henkin called it ignoble and outrageous. 25 I would call it
absolutely ridiculous. Every other country has criticized the United
States on this score. Why enter into a treaty if you are going to say
that it should be tailored so as to have absolutely no possible impact
on your legal obligations. I find this approach completely hypocritical.
The second principle is unnecessary in view of the first principle.
It held that there should be a non-self-executing declaration attached
to all the treaties so they would not have any impact in United States
law. If the treaty were not to have any impact on United States law,
why then worry, at least from the domestic perspective, about the
declarations, reservations, and understandings contemplated by the
first principle? It seems terribly unfortunate to have this non-self-
executing declaration attached to every one of the treaties. Unfor-
tunately, it is now a fait accompli, and it may be the price we have
to pay for ratification.
The third principle involves states' rights, and responds to such
claims by proposing a reservation in the form of a federal-state clause.
The states' rights concerns arose forty years ago, but are completely
unjustified today. The interstate commerce power has been interpreted
so broadly since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
the federal government can do most anything in this area of the law.
Any rights supposedly "taken" from the states under a human rights
treaty can similarly be taken away today under the interstate commerce
clause. So the reservation is legally irrelevant.
At the 1978 hearings on the treaties, almost all witnesses strongly
supported their ratification, with minimal reservations. There was no
substantial opposition. Neither was there much interest by the Foreign
Relations Committee. Senator Pell opened up the hearings because
the Committee's Chairman, Senator Church, a good liberal, pro-
gressive, pro-ratification-of-the-Genocide Convention member of
Congress, had an election that year and apparently was loath to hold
hearings on the human rights treaties with his re-election bid very
close. Of course, he lost the election anyway. Attendance by other
members of the Committee was spotty. There were only two Senators
present when I testified, Senators Zorinsky and Javits. Yet, the hear-
ings remain a great source of information on the treaties. You will
find all sorts of interesting comments and memoranda in them. As
we know, the Foreign Relations Committee has never addressed the
23 HENKIN, THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, IN U.S. RATIFICATION
OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 15, at 22.
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treaties again in the eleven years since the hearings were held.
Under the Reagan Administration, nongovernmental organizations
did not make a major issue of the unratified treaties. Initially, in
1981, they were busy trying to keep the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs alive in the Department of State, and
opposing Senate confirmation of an individual nominated to head
that bureau who professed to want to see it abolished. Later, from
1982 until 1984, the issue of the treaties remained unaddressed. I
finally wrote a letter to a good friend who in 1985 was Assistant
Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. I enquired as to the status of the
human rights treaties. As Mr. Baab indicated, they were, and still
are, "under study." The government rates the priorities treaties have
on a scale of one to six. If you are anywhere beyond one or two,
you are not even in the ballpark. Five is "under study." This status
was reaffirmed by the current Assistant Legal Adviser two years ago
and orally within the last two weeks. That is very sad. I have heard
of sitting on a treaty. If you sit on a treaty, it may hatch. However,
I do not call this sitting on a treaty. I call it squashing a treaty.
It has been very difficult to pin down the State Department on
the status of the treaties. Mr. Schifter, the Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights, waffled on the issue, and nobody really knew what
position the Department held, unless you had read an obscure doc-
ument by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
also known as the United States Helsinki Commission, that contained
some remarks of Mr. Schifter.2 6 He had gone up to Ottawa in 1985
and the United States had been harassed there for not having ratified
the Civil and Political Covenant. So he let loose with a tirade against
Poland for a variety of reasons, pointing out that while they had
ratified the Covenant they had not complied with it. Moreover, he
remarked, Poland had not ratified the Optional Protocol. This remark
came, of course, from the representative of a state whose Executive
Branch had not even sent up the Optional Protocol for Senate advice
and consent! In any event, he contended that since the Covenant
could not be enforced effectively it was pointless for the United States
to ratify it. In 1988, he again acknowledged this view in a hearing
before the United States Helsinki Commission, reading portions of
his relevant Ottawa speech into the record. 27
26 Implementation of the Helsinki Awards: Hearings Before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 194, 196-98 (1985).
27 See supra note 18.
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That brings us to the Bush Administration, where Mr. Schifter
remains as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. Last winter, Sec-
retary of State Baker wrote a letter to Senator Pell, the somewhat
casual Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I was saddened
to see that Secretary Baker's letter represented more of the same
thing: the treaties remain "under study." The ball, said Secretary
Baker, is in the Senate's court.
There are several ways to assess the present situation. Optimistically,
one may draw some hope from what President Bush said in his
statement on Human Rights Day last December 10, 1989. He said,
in honoring the Universal Declaration, that the great document not
only reaffirms many of the principles enshrined in our Bill of Rights,
which of course is true, but that it also serves as a blueprint for its
signatories as we work for freedom and peace in the world. Of
course, it is no longer just a blueprint. The house is being built, and
it is time for the United States to enter it along with the other nations.
President Bush also defined human rights very narrowly, failing to
talk about economic or social rights. The Economic, Social and
Cultural Covenant is a formal treaty that President Carter signed
and sent to the Senate in 1978. President Bush is not going to withdraw
it or any of the other pending human rights treaties. But he is going
to sit on them or ignore them unless human rights groups and other
United States organizations make strong, principled arguments for
their ratification.
If I may, let me suggest briefly a few steps that I think should be
taken. First, a political constituency has to be created, as has been
suggested before, to support these human rights instruments. We are
dealing principally with civil rights. Thus church groups, the labor
unions, and civic organizations, not merely international human rights
ones, must get involved. Amnesty International USA finally joined
the effort in the last year or so. The Procedural Aspects of Inter-
national Law Institute held a conference on the ratification of the
treaties in March 1989, inviting every single major human rights
organization. It was a conference to replicate ten years later what
was accomplished in 1979. It was held, again, in the same room
where the Foreign Relations Committee meets. Disappointingly, less
people attended than in 1979. The reason, as Mr. Baab indicated,
may be that after a treaty has been submitted the steam eventually
goes out from underneath efforts to secure its approval. The lowered
attendance indicated a lack of commitment by the very international
human rights NGOs that should be involved in getting these other
groups together.
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Therefore, this political constituency must be built. I am not sug-
gesting that if it were there, the door would be open and we could
just walk right through the ratification process. I was talking yesterday
in Washington to a staffer from the United States Helsinki Com-
mission. She said they hear all kinds of things about the Helsinki
process: abuses, strengths, weaknesses and so on. Nobody, however,
writes about the human rights treaties. If anybody were to write
about them, she said, the Commission would have to focus upon
them and put out reports. Why not organize, like Amnesty Inter-
national does with letters for prisoners abroad, a letter writing cam-
paign to the United States Helsinki Commission and to members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am sad to say that a
major foundation recently refused to grant the money to fund the
organizational effort I proposed. Until such an effort occurs, we are
not going to have any forward movement despite all the legal ar-
guments that may be advanced.
Second, the President and the Department of State, as well as the
Foreign Relations Committee, must become engaged. How can we
overcome their lethargy? I would recommend two specific things.
Initially, I think a background study is needed of all the pending
human rights treaties. Nobody has ever analyzed the hearings, articles,
and memorandum written about even the four treaties sent up by
President Carter, much less the other instruments awaiting ratifica-
tion. Obviously, the NGOs and the government must assess in good
faith our commitment to these treaties. Informal meetings could be
held. The Legal Adviser to the Department of State has an advisory
committee that would provide a forum for such exchanges. The United
States Helsinki Commission might provide a forum. In this way the
issues would be debated and arguments for ratification pressed upon
members of the two political branches.
Additionally, specific case studies should be made of the five
primary treaties: the Civil and Political Covenant, the Economic,
Social and Cultural Covenant, the American Convention, the Racial
Convention and the Convention on Women. There is something
"wrong" with each one of these treaties, as Mr. Baab has indicated.
No one will touch, despite Judge Buergenthal's eloquent pleas, the
American Convention, because it raises the abortion question. The
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant still suffers from heavy-
handed treatment by Elliot Abrams and Jean Kirkpatrick. I cannot
understand why the Racial Convention would not receive the Senate's
prompt consent. Yet, as Clyde Ferguson said so eloquently shortly
before his death, there is a lingering racism that we all know still
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exists in the United States. Lastly, the Convention on Women raises
the question of the Equal Rights Amendment, equality of women,
and so on. Therefore, the argument goes, it is not a propitious time
to seek its ratification either. One should not succumb to the counsels
of defeat, however, for such an approach never got human rights
activists anywhere. Again, arguments must be mobilized and political
pressure brought to bear upon the Executive Branch and Congress.
Third, rather than the shotgun approach, I would advocate ranking
the treaties in order of importance and the likelihood of ratification
and starting from the top. In my opinion we should select the Civil
and Political Covenant to receive the focus of our attention. I lack
the time to analyze the four reservations, two declarations, one state-
ment, and one understanding that were attached to that particular
instrument by President Carter. I think none of them are necessary;
some of them are harmless; one or two of them should certainly be
struck. I would suggest that we urge the ratification of the Optional
Protocol as well. After all, 1991 is the bicentennial of the ratification
of the U.S. Bill of Rights, and what could be more appropriate than
to aim in 1991 for at least serious consideration, if not ratification,
of this keystone of the International Bill of Rights. If the Soviet
Union and the states in Eastern Europe are doing so, why not the
U.S.? Why not, indeed!
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